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Abstract 
We examine the effect of changes in the regulatory environment on the conduct of financial statement audits 
in a European setting. These changes include the adoption of risk-based auditing, new Audit Risk Standards 
and increased scrutiny of audit quality by a new, co-ordinated oversight body in each Member State. We 
investigate this by analysing the audit hours and fees and their determinants for clients of Big N audit firms 
in Finland in 1996 and 2010. Our results show that audit fees and audit effort by senior auditors were 
generally higher for high risk clients in 2010 than in 1996. Second, we find that the relationship in 1996 
between the client being owner-managed and lower audit hours for both senior and junior auditors is absent 
in 2010. This supports our argument that the increased auditor scepticism has increased audit effort for 
owner-managed firms. Third, we find that the average number of junior staff hours increased between 1996 
and 2010, but the variance across engagements declined. In contrast, senior auditor hours (and total audit 
hours) decreased, but the variance across engagements increased. This supports the view that risk-based 
auditing has increased the efficiency of audits. However, it suggests that the general increase in regulation 
and the tightening of audit standards, reinforced by the new quality inspections, have led to less emphasis 
on processes requiring professional judgment and more emphasis on compliance with rules. These 
unintended consequences should be of interest to the auditing profession and policy makers. 
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Unintended consequences of changes in the regulatory landscape on the statutory audit process 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past 15 years, efforts to stem the wave of financial scandals in large companies have resulted 
in substantial changes in the regulatory landscape and the way in which auditors carry out their duties 
(Humphrey, Kausar, Loft & Woods, 2011; Knechel, 2013). In many jurisdictions, the development of 
auditing regulations has moved from a national level to an international level. In addition, there has 
been a shift in the regulation of auditors from self-regulation by the accountancy profession to 
substantial oversight by government authorized bodies, coordinated through international networks 
(Humphrey & Loft, 2013). At the same time, auditing standards have become more detailed and 
prescriptive, placing greater emphasis on assessing client risk in terms of the company’s operations, 
internal controls and management fraud. These developments have contributed to the increased 
standardisation of parts of the auditing process. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of 
these changes on the way in which financial statement audits are conducted. 
This study is set in Finland which has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995.  At that 
time, guidance for auditors and quality checks in Finland were based on recommendations and 
voluntary peer-review provided by professional associations of auditors. However, in 2005, the 
European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB) was set up by the European Commission to 
co-ordinate a new public oversight system of statutory auditors and audit firms in EU Member States, 
which is enforced through a network of national oversight bodies. This was followed in 2006 by the 
Directive on the Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts (2006/43/EC).1 This 
meant that future guidance for auditors would come from International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) 
issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the independent 
standard-setting body of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). In addition, the quality 
                                                     
1 In 2014 this Directive was replaced by Directive 2014/56/EU. 
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checks previously provided by the Finnish accountancy profession were replaced by systematic 
inspections by a national oversight body, the Auditing Board of the Central Chamber of Commerce 
(AB3C).2 
Empirical evidence on the effect of the changing audit environment is scarce as information about the 
audit process at different points in time is extremely difficult to obtain. To the best of our knowledge, 
only Bell, Doogar and Solomon (2008) have undertaken a broad empirical assessment of changes in 
audit processes over time. Their study was set in the USA and examined the effect of the business risk 
approach to auditing developed in the 1990s. Their results show that although fees and total audit hours 
were generally lower in 2002 than in 1992, audit effort by senior auditors (partners or managers) was 
higher in general, and particularly high for riskier clients.3 
The present study contributes to the literature by extending our understanding of changes in the audit 
process from the mid-1990s to 2010 in a European setting, where there is a lower risk of litigation than 
in the USA (Francis, 2004). More importantly, it is set in the context of major changes in the regulatory 
landscape (Lennox, 2009) that occurred after the period studied by Bell et al. (2008). These changes 
not only increased the scrutiny of audit work quality, but also the documentation of client risk in the 
audit process. However, this may have had unintended consequences, such as making auditors place 
less emphasis on processes requiring professional judgment and more emphasis on compliance with 
rules and procedures (Humphrey et al., 2011). Our aim is to shed light on this issue by investigating the 
determinants of audit effort in a changing regulatory environment. 
Using a unique set of fee and audit effort data for 140 clients of large audit firms in Finland, we provide 
empirical evidence of significant changes in the audit process between 1996 and 2010. Our results show 
that the adoption of risk-based audits improved audit efficiency: senior auditor hours declined on 
                                                     
2 The AB3C was replaced by a new supervisory body under the auspices of the Finnish Patent and Registration 
Office in 2016.   
3 Bell et al. (2008) analyses changes prior the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and related 
regulations (p. 731, footnote 4). 
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average, but senior auditors (partners and managers) became more responsive to client risk. We also 
find a relative increase in junior staff hours over the period, with junior staff becoming less responsive 
to client risk. This is consistent with more hours spent by junior auditors on compliance and 
documentation work. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the changes in the 
auditing environment in Finland and develops hypotheses on how the way in which auditors carry out 
their work may have been influenced by these changes. This is followed by a description of our methods 
and data. We then report our results and conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings 
and the limitations of the study. 
2. Major changes in the auditing environment since the mid-1990s 
Business risk approach  
A fundamental change in audit regulation between 1996 and 2010 was the introduction of a more risk-
oriented approach that required greater documentation of the client’s business risks (Curtis and Turley, 
2005; van Buuren, Koch, van Nieuw Amerongen & Wright, 2014). However, whether audits have 
become more risk-oriented depends on how willing the auditor is to follow the new requirements (ISA 
315) and how strongly they are enforced. 
In the 1990s, the major audit firms started developing new audit approaches based on a deep 
understanding of a client’s business environment, plans and risks. Their methods were generally 
referred to as business risk auditing (Curtis & Turley, 2007; Eilifsen, Knechel & Wallage, 2001; Lemon, 
Tatum & Turley, 2000; Peecher, Schwartz, & Solomon, 2007; Robson, Humphrey, Khalifa & Jones, 
2007).4 A common feature of business risk auditing is a top-down analysis of the client’s business risks 
linked to the audit risks of the engagement and conditioning the audit plan on the most critical of those 
                                                     
4 The term ‘strategic systems auditing’ was also used by some of the researchers responding to the monograph 
published by KPMG (Bell, Marrs & Solomon, 1997; 2002; 2005). 
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risks. By the end of the 1990s, business risk auditing had been adopted in principle by all the leading 
international audit firms. The underlying objectives of the approach were to increase the efficiency of 
auditing and give greater value to the client by providing a deeper understanding of the business risks. 
In the USA, Bell et al. (2008) studied the impact of the move from traditional transaction-based auditing 
to business risk auditing on audit labour usage and audit fees between 1989 and 2002. They expected 
that the increased emphasis on more complex risk assessments and audit judgments would lead to an 
increase in the proportion of senior auditor time relative to the total labour usage. However, they found 
that the total audit labour hours in 2002 were about 10% lower than in 1989, but the total senior auditor 
hours were about 25% higher (an increase of about 40% in partner/manager hours).  In Europe, a study 
of the application of business risk auditing at a Czechoslovakian bank in 1996 (Eilifsen et al., 2001) 
provides similar evidence. The study found a significant shift from substantive test evidence to evidence 
concerning risks, controls and performance measures, with less reliance on evidence from the 
documentation of individual transactions. At the same time, experienced staff and specialists had 
become more involved in the audit team. 
A second argument for audits becoming more risk-oriented is the introduction of the new risk ISAs. At 
the start of the new millennium, major financial scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, Ahold and 
Parmalat, led to calls for tighter oversight of auditors (Levitt, 2002) and caused many to question the 
efficacy of business risk auditing methods. Within a few years, professional guidance on risk auditing 
was fundamentally changed as the IAASB issued a suite of revised and new Audit Risk Standards: ISA 
500 (revised), Audit Evidence, ISA 315, Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement 
through Understanding the Entity and Its Environment, ISA 330, The Auditor’s Procedures in Response 
to Assessed Risks and an addition to ISA 200, Objective and Principles Governing an Audit of Financial 
Statements (IFAC, 2003). ISA 240, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of 
Financial Statements (effective from 2009) expands on how ISAs 315 and 330 should be applied in 
relation to risks of material misstatement due to fraud. Somewhat ironically, many of the precepts of 
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business risk auditing were embedded in the new standards, particularly ISA 315 (Curtis & Turley, 
2005). 
In Finland, the new risk standards were introduced in 2006 by the KHT Institute (the Finnish 
professional association of auditors), but there are two reasons why they may not be reflected in audit 
work as intended. First, the consequences of auditor liability may be less severe in a low litigation 
environment like Finland and auditors might simply ignore standards they consider are too difficult to 
follow. To illustrate this, in 2014 the AB3C in Finland inspected the quality of the audits of 102 auditors 
with the following results: only 79% auditors passed the inspection; 15% were subjected to a re-
inspection; and 6% were rejected. One of the main reasons for not passing the inspection was non-
compliance with ISAs. 
The second reason is that the status of the ISAs in the EU is still unclear. Until the end of the 1990s, 
professional guidance for auditors in Finland was provided by the national professional associations, 
such as the KHT Institute, and the Nordic Federation of Public Accountants (NRF). From 2000, this 
guidance was based on the ISAs, but initially these were regarded as recommendations for good practice 
rather than binding professional standards (Niemi & Sundgren, 2008). This attitude changed when 
Finland passed the Auditing Act 2007 which stipulates that auditors must comply with the ISAs. The 
Act also incorporated the requirements of the Directive on the statutory audit of annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts (2006/43/EC) which amended the Fourth and Seventh Company Law Directives 
(78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC). However, at that time, none of the ISAs had been endorsed by the EU. 
On balance, it seems reasonable to assume that the risk standards are reflected in the auditing process, 
at least in larger audit firms. Even if the ISAs lacked the backing of the EU law, they are enforced by 
oversight bodies such as the AB3C, which uses them as a benchmark for assessing good auditing 
practice. Moreover, AB3C’s quality inspection report 2014 indicates that nearly all the auditors that did 
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not pass the inspection were from small audit firms.5 Therefore, even in a low litigation environment 
like Finland, it is likely that the ISA risk standards are followed due to inspections by oversight bodies 
such as AB3C. Moreover, leading audit firms operate as international networks and tend to harmonize 
their audit methodologies across the network. We argue that the increased focus on the business risk 
has led to auditors adjusting their audit processes over time to be more responsive to unique client risk 
concerns. This is reflected in our first hypothesis:  
H1a: The positive association between client business risk and audit effort and fees is stronger 
in 2010 than in 1996. 
The assessment of client risks and responses to those risks, as required by ISAs 315 and 330 play a 
critical role in audit planning. Audit planning is carried out by senior auditors (partners and managers). 
The results of Bell et al. (2008) indicate that the move to audit methods emphasizing client risks increase 
the amount of senior auditor time allocated to the audit of higher risk clients. The introduction of ISAs 
315 and 330, and their enforcement by outside inspections, reinforces the risk approach even in low 
litigation jurisdictions such as Finland. Therefore, the more risky the client, the more thorough the audit 
planning needs to be to map business risks to auditor planning. This leads to our second hypothesis:  
H1b: The positive association between client business risk and senior auditor hours relative to 
total auditor hours is stronger in 2010 than in 1996. 
A common factor of the accounting scandals in the early 2000s (e.g., Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat) was 
fraudulent financial reporting. This wave of management-related frauds led to an increase in the 
auditors’ responsibility for detecting fraud by management. An example of this regulatory response was 
the introduction of ISA 240, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial 
Statements (IAASB, 2009), which sensitizes auditors to the risk of fraudulent reporting and causes them 
                                                     
5 The report does not contain information about identities of auditors or firm names. However, we base our 
conclusion to the information that almost all auditors not passing the quality inspections were second tier HTM-
auditors, who typically work in small firms focusing on small clients. 
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to be less willing to accept management’s assertions at face value. Under normal circumstances, owner-
managed firms might be considered to have lower business risk than firms where the owners are not 
involved in the day-to-day management of the business because owner-managers have access to 
accounting records and place less reliance on audited financial statements. There is also lower demand 
for auditing in owner-managed firms since there is less likelihood of information asymmetry resulting 
from the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Therefore, in the absence of 
fraud risk, auditors would generally consider risk to be lower for manager-owned firms.  With the 
increase in scepticism (Nelson 2009) required by ISA 240, we expect that auditors will be less willing 
to accept assertions by management at face value.  This suggests that auditors would have to increase 
audit work for owner-managed firms, leading to our third hypothesis: 
H1c: Audit effort and fees are higher in manager-owned firms in 2010 than in 1996. 
We test H1a and H2b using two test variables: (1) the audit team assessed level of inherent risk in the 
audit engagement and (2) the ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets (c.f. Hay, Knechel & 
Wong, 2006). We test H1c using an indicator variable for owner-managed firms.  
Development of standardization 
Compliance with auditing standards has become a critical concern for audit firms due to the increased 
emphasis on ex post verification of the audit process. Since auditors are subject to potential second-
guessing by inspectors, they want clear signals as to what they must do to pass an inspection. This has 
created a conundrum. Even if the emphasis on business risk suggests an increased need for professional 
judgment due to the idiosyncratic nature of each engagement, the inspectors will use general standards 
on auditing to evaluate the quality of the engagement that encourage standardization across 
engagements (Knechel, 2013). How did this development from peer-reviews to inspections by oversight 
bodies happen in Finland?  
In the early 1990s Finland experienced a deep recession and a large number of business failures. This 
led to questions about the quality of the audit. The Finnish professional associations of auditors reacted 
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to the adverse publicity by initiating quality assurance programmes based on voluntary peer-reviews. 
In 1995, when the first Auditing Act (936/28.10.1994) was introduced, supervisory bodies such as 
AB3C took over responsibility for quality assurance. However, the actual quality assurance work was 
still conducted by the professional associations until 2009 when AB3C introduced their inspection 
regime. The move from peer review to inspection by oversight bodies was instigated by the Statutory 
Audit Directive (2006/43/EC) in 2006 which required Member States to establish an effective system 
of public oversight for statutory auditors and audit firms. The Statutory Audit Directive was 
implemented in the Finnish Auditing Act 2007.  
Although ISAs are based on principles that allow auditors to exercise professional judgment, auditors 
can feel “increased pressures of conformity – of a rise in checklists and tick-box approaches to auditing 
which place less emphasis on processes of professional judgment and more emphasis on a compliance 
with rules and procedures mentality” (Humphrey et al., 2011, pp. 446-7; Dowling, Knechel and 
Moroney 2015). This feeling seems warranted as sanctions of non-compliance are high. For example, 
AB3C in Finland now inspects the quality of audit work systematically and rejection leads to a re-
inspection. Auditors who fail the re-inspection run the risk of having their authorization to conduct 
statutory audits withdrawn. In 2013 there were two cases where the Auditing Board of the State (ABS) 
cancelled the auditor’s right to conduct audits (TILA 5/2013; TILA 6/2013).  
However, it is possible that larger audit firms have a more structured approach to auditing than their 
smaller counterparts. Therefore, large audit firms may need to make little change to their procedures or 
documentation to fulfil the more extensive requirements of compliance and documentation work. Even 
if it is not obvious that larger audit firms are affected by the standardization development of auditing, 
the reports of the AB3C in Finland provide evidence that small audit firms have had to adopt a more 
standardized approach to pass the inspections by the oversight body. This leads to our hypothesis 
regarding the move from voluntary peer-reviews to compulsory inspections by oversight bodies:  
H2:  Compliance and documentation work in auditing has increased over the period 1996 to 
2010.  
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We do not observe the actual audit process and the different tasks conducted by the audit team. 
Therefore, we test H2 using the changes in labour mix of audit work due to increased compliance work, 
and also using the changes in the variances of senior auditor hours and junior staff hours. It is likely 
that most of the tick-box compliance and documentation work is done by junior staff in the audit team. 
Therefore, we also analyse whether total auditor hours have increased relative to number of hours 
contributed by senior auditors (partners and managers). Finally, given the tick-box nature of compliance 
work, we expect the amount of work has become less sensitive to client characteristics and junior staff 
hours vary less across clients in 2010 than in 1996.  
3. Research methods  
This study is based on the comparative analysis of a sample of audits conducted in 1996 and 2010. We 
start by describing the process used to collect the data and then analyse changes in the overall levels of 
audit effort and fees to assess the impact of changes in audit methods and regulation on the audit process.  
Data  
In order to test our hypotheses, we collected proprietary data relating to the statutory audits of Finnish 
private and listed companies conducted by leading international audit firms (the Big N) at two points in 
time: 1996 and 2010.6 Our sample contains 81 audit engagement conducted in 1996 and 59 in 2010.  
Focusing on the Big N audit firms helps to control for variations in audit quality across audit firms and 
improves the comparability of our findings given the time gap between the audits.  While many factors 
influence the audit process over such a long period of time, the increased focus on client risk and/or 
standardization should be reflected as systematic changes in the labour mix in the audit team and the 
drivers of audit effort and fees. Furthermore, the focus on relatively large, complex companies improves 
the comparability of our results to those obtained in countries such as the USA where data are only 
                                                     
6 The Auditing Act of 1994 (936/28.10.1994) was effective for all audits of 1996 year-end financial statements 
(i.e., the year of our initial data).   
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available for publicly listed companies. Financial and insurance companies are excluded since they may 
not be comparable to companies in other industries in terms of audit effort and fees. 
For audit engagements conducted in 1996,7 we first identified clients of the Big Six audit firms with net 
sales exceeding 100 million Finnish marks (€16.7 million) using two sources: Statistics Finland’s 
database of large Finnish firms and the database of auditors of large and medium-sized Finnish 
companies provided by Balance Consulting Ltd. Four of the then Big Six firms provided access to their 
internal audit records for 103 engagements (including audit hours) and participated in the questionnaire 
survey that gathered data on our variables of interest. We also obtained audit partner assessments of the 
quality of their clients’ internal controls and the overall level of inherent risk for these engagements. 
The questionnaires were sent to a contact at each audit firm who distributed them to the partners 
responsible for the 1996 audits and we received 81 usable responses (79%). As we knew the identity of 
the client firms in the sample, we were able to supplement the survey data with publicly available 
financial statement data. Ownership data were hand-collected from the databases of the leading Finnish 
credit analyst company, Asiakastieto Oy, and other sources. 
The 2010 data were collected from one of the Big Four audit firms that had participated in 1996. 
However, we were unable to obtain the identity of audit clients or the engagement partners. Staff at the 
Big Four firm handled the collection of data on the behalf of the researchers after the random selection 
of 110 clients with net sales exceeding €20 million. A questionnaire was distributed to the relevant audit 
partners to gather information about each engagement that would allow us to compare 1996 and 2010 
audits, and we received 59 usable responses (54%). To guarantee the anonymity of the client firms, the 
number of subsidiaries was transformed to a 10-point scale using deciles of the distribution. For 
comparability, we performed a similar transformation for the 1996 subsidiary data. 
                                                     
7 This data was collected in 1997. 
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Statistical model 
To test our hypotheses, we use the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 



 + 2010  +   +  +
  + +  + +
  ++ +  = 
1098
7654
3210
YTINGMANUFACTURLISTED
IAFICQUALITYSUBSLNSALES 
EDOWNERMANAGINVRECINHRISKTAUDITEFFOR
    (1) 
In equation (1), AUDITEFFORT is a measure of the effort expended by the auditor during the course 
of the audit. We use two aggregate measures of auditor effort, audit hours (LNTOTALHOURS) and 
audit fees (LNFEES) which we normalize using natural logarithms. In addition, we disaggregate audit 
hours into senior auditor hours (hours worked by partners and managers)   (LNPTRMGRHOURS) and 
junior staff hours (LNSTAFFHOURS). To examine the differential effects of the changes in labour mix 
in the audit team,8 we also examine the ratio of other audit hours divided by the total hours 
(LNSTAFFHOURS/ LNTOTALHOURS).  
(Table 1) 
INHRISK, an overall inherent risk assessment and INVREC, relative amount of inventories and 
receivables are our measures of client business risk, used in our tests of hypotheses H1a and H1b. 
OWNERMANAGED, which is coded as 1 if the firm is predominantly owner-managed (> 50%) and 0 
otherwise,9 is used to test H1c that audit effort and fees increased for owner-managed clients. Because 
all our hypotheses require the comparison of the years 1996 and 2010, we augment equation (1) with 
interactions of our predictor variables and Y2010, which is coded 1 if the observations are from year 
2010 and 0 otherwise. The association between the interactions (INHRISK×Y2010, INVREC×Y2010 
and OWNERMANAGED×Y2010) and audit effort will inform whether the association between auditor 
effort and risk changed between 1996 and 2010. 
                                                     
8 Audit fees in our data are the actual total audit fees. We do not have information on billing rates for different 
ranks of labour. 
9 For reasons of confidentiality, we do not know the precise ownership level. 
12 
 
We use six control variables in the models. We include client size (LNSIZE) because the size and 
complexity of operations affect audit effort (Bell et al., 2008; Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006; O’Keefe 
et al., 1994; Simunic, 1980; Simunic & Stein, 1996). Client size relates directly to the volume of the 
operations and the number of business transactions, thus reflecting the amount of audit work required. 
We control for complexity of operations with the number of subsidiaries (SUBS). From prior literature 
we know that the complexity of operations vary considerably across clients and can influence the audit 
effort required for an engagement (Bell, Peecher & Solomon, 2005; Mock & Wright, 1993; 1999; Stein, 
Simunic & O’Keefe, 1994). We control for the client’s investments in internal controls in two ways. 
Following O’Keefe et al. (1994), we measure the senior auditors’ assessment of the overall quality of 
internal controls on a 5-point Likert scale (ICQUALITY). Following Knechel & Willekens (2006), IAF 
captures whether the client has an internal audit function, and is coded as 1 if there is an internal audit 
function and 0 otherwise. This is important because reliable controls can be used to justify a reduction 
in the substantive tests of business transactions (Ettredge, Reed & Stone, 2000; Felix, Gramling & 
Maletta, 2001; Gramling, 1999; Schneider, 1985). Prior research (Hay et al., 2006; Hay, Knechel & 
Ling, 2008) suggests that the relationship between internal control and the level of audit effort is likely 
to have changed between 1996 and 2010. LISTED is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the client 
company belongs to a group that is listed on a stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Companies with 
dispersed ownership present greater potential liability for an auditor (Simunic & Stein, 1996). Finally, 
we control for industry-effects by including a dummy for manufacturing firms (MANUFACTURING) 
which is coded 1 if the firm belongs to manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. 
Y2010 tests the change of the overall level of the dependent variable (whether the coefficient of Y2010 
is statistically significant, audit effort changed from 1996 to 2010). To better facilitate the inferences 
on the tests of overall changes, we centre the values of continuous variables over 1996 and 2010 
(keeping the original categorical variables) and re-estimate without the interaction variables to get the 
effect of any change over the time period.  
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To further analyse the variables of interest, we examine whether the regression coefficients are different 
from 0 in both years under study. For the 1996 data, this test is reflected in the main effects for INHRISK, 
INVREC and OWNERMANAGED. To test whether the regression coefficients are different from 0 for 
the 2010 sample, we run a model using 2010 data only.  
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis  
Table 2, Panel A (Panel B) presents descriptive statistics for the continuous (dichotomous) variables for 
1996 and 2010. Panel A also reports the tests of differences (t-test and Wilcoxon) and the equality of 
variances between 1996 and 2010 samples. Comparison of means and medians for our dependent 
variables (LNTOTALHOURS, LNPTRMGRHRS, LNSTAFFHRS and LNFEES) shows no significant 
differences between 1996 and 2010, although sample firms in 2010 are somewhat larger (LNSALES) 
than in the 1996 sample (p = 0.104). Consistent with this, the mean (median) of the hours to sales ratio 
(HOURS/SALES) decreased from 4.245 (3.417) in 1996 to 2.478 (1.757) in 2010 (p = 0.002 and p < 
0.001, respectively).10  The fees to sales ratio (FEES/SALES) did not change between 1996 and 2010. 
However, we see that the mean of the senior auditor hours to total hours ratio (PTRMGR/TOTALHRS) 
decreased from 0.564 in 1996 to 0.475 in 2010 (p = 0.064).The descriptive statistics show no significant 
changes in the mean or median of the independent variables used in our tests (ICQUALITY, LNSALES, 
SUBS, INVREC, IAF, INHERENTRISK, OWNERMANAGED, LISTED or MANUFACTURING). 
(Table 2) 
Table 3, Panels A and B, show the correlation matrices for our data for 1996 and 2010. As expected, 
the measures of audit effort (LNHOURS, LNPTRMGRHOURS, LNSTAFFHOURS and LNFEES), 
which are the dependent variables of our multivariate models, are positively correlated. LNSALES is 
                                                     
10 Data collected for sales and audit fees in 1996 were originally in Finnish marks and converted to euros using 
the 2010 Consumer Index and the official exchange rate.   
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positively correlated with all audit effort measures in 1996 and 2010. Turning to our variables of 
interest, comparison of Panel A and B shows that audit effort, particularly LNPTRMGRHOURS and 
LNFEES are positively correlated in 2010, but not in 1996. For OWNERMANAGED, the correlation 
matrices show that it is negatively correlated with the four audit effort or fee measures in 1996, but the 
correlations disappear in 2010.  
(Table 3) 
Client risks and audit effort (H1a, H1b and H1c) 
Table 4 reports the results of our analysis of audit effort and audit fees using an OLS regression model 
for the four different measures of audit effort (LNTOTALHOURS, LNPTRMGRHOURS, 
LNSTAFFHOURS and LNFEES), and for the difference between LNPTRMGRHOURS and 
LNSTAFFHOURS (DIFFERENCE).11  Panel A reports results for our model that tests the differences 
between 1996 and 2010 by pooling the two years of data and interacting a dummy variable Y2010 with 
each of the independent variables. The model also tests whether the regression coefficients of variables 
(without interactions) for 1996 are different from zero. 
For 2010, we test whether regression coefficients are different from zero by dropping the interaction 
variables and using only observations from 2010. These results are reported in Panel B in Table 4. Panel 
C reports our additional tests in which we remove all the 1996 audits conducted by firms that only 
appear in the 1996 sample (i.e., we only include audit firms where we have observations in both 1996 
and 2010). Using only observations from comparable audit firm(s) in 1996 (n = 50) and 2010 (n = 59) 
helps us to control for the differences that might arise from different firms instead of changes in auditing 
environment. 
(Table 4) 
                                                     
11 We do not find heteroscedasticity using the White test (White, 1980) and the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch & 
Pagan, 1979) in any of the models used to test the hypotheses. 
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We first examine the effect of risk on auditor effort in the individual years.  Looking at the results for 
1996 audits in Table 4, Panel A (the main effects for risk), we see that INHRISK does not influence 
either total auditor hours (LNTOTALHOURS, p < .172) or audit fees (LNFEE, p < .310).  For 2010, 
Table 4, Panel B shows that INHRISK may be marginally associated with LNTOTALHOURS (p < .107) 
and is positively associated with LNFEE (p < .066). INVREC is not associated with LNTOTALHOURS 
in 1996 (p <. 385) or 2010 (p < .955), nor is it associated with LNFEE in either 1996 (p < .265) or 2010 
(p < .949).   
To test H1a, we consider the coefficient on the interactions of the two risk measures (INHRISK, 
INVREC) and our time dummy for 2010.  LNTOTALHOURS is not differentially affected by risk in 
2010 when compared to 1996 using either risk measure (INHRISK, p < .585; INVREC, p < .625).  
Similarly, LNFEE is not differentially affected by risk in 2010 when compared to 1996 using either risk 
measure (INHRISK, p < .328; INVREC, p < .527).  Consequently, we find no evidence to support H1a. 
We test H1b using the coefficient on the two risk measures (INHRISK, INVREC) interacted with our 
time dummy for 2010 in the model for LNPTRMGRHOURS.  Table 4, Panel A shows that senior auditor 
hours are higher in 2010 conditional on INHRISK (p < .072). However, senior auditor hours are not 
significantly higher in 2010 when risk is measured using INVREC in a two tail test (p < .190).  Overall, 
since INHRISK can be interpreted as a direct measure of risk, while INVREC is an indirect measure, the 
results in Table 4 provide some support for H1b that senior auditors were more sensitive to risk in 2010 
than in 1996. 
We test H1c using the coefficient on OWNERMANAGED interacted with our time dummy for 2010 in 
the models for LNTOTALHOURS and LNFEE. First, we see that owner-managed audits in 1996 involve 
less effort than firms that are not owner-managed (p < .001 for both coefficients).  Further, we see an 
increase in LNTOTALHOURS (p < .002) and LNFEE (p < .003) that is associated with owner-managed 
firms in 2010. Finally, OWNERMANAGER does not influence either hours (p < .880) or fees (p < .895) 
in Panel B.  These results suggest that the negative association between audit effort and managerial 
16 
 
ownership observed in 1996 had reversed by 2010.  Therefore, the results for H1c suggest that auditors 
are more sensitive to the risk associated with owner-managed firms in 2010 than in 1996. 
Increased effort due to compliance and documentation work (H2) 
Next, we examine H2 that audit effort has become more focused on standardized testing and 
documentation. While we cannot test this directly, we expect that an increase in standardization and 
documentation will mainly affect junior auditors and will be relatively insensitive to risk conditions. 
The evidence regarding H2 is based on the coefficient of Y2010 in our regressions reported in Tables 
4, 5 and 6.  
First, in Panel A of Table 4, we see that LNSTAFFHOURS is marginally sensitive to INHRISK in 1996 
in a one-tail test (two-tail p < .161) but is not sensitive to INVREC (p < .406).  In 2010, staff hours are 
clearly not sensitive to risk using either measure (INHRISK, p < .332; INVREC, p < .716).    Further, 
examining the coefficients on the interaction terms we see that LNSTAFFHOURS is not more sensitive 
to risk in 2010 than in 1996 (INHRISK, p < .937; INVREC, p < .464).  These results suggest that the 
effort of junior auditors is not conditional on risk, which suggests that their work may be driven by 
standardization and documentation as predicted in H2. 
To further test this possibility, we first compare the work load of partners and managers and staff over 
time.  These results are reported in the DIFFERENCE column of Panel A in Table 4.  Here we see that 
partners and managers conduct significantly less work on engagements in 2010 (p = .109) even though 
their work is more sensitive to risk (see H1b).  This is confirmed by the positive coefficient for Y2010 
in the LNPRTMGRHOURS model (p = .082) and the insignificant coefficient for Y2010 in the 
LNSTAFFHOURS model (p < .586).  Second, we repeat the test of H2 using regressions with centred 
values for continuous variables and report the results in Table 5. In this model our interest lies again in 
the variable Y2010 which is again statistically significant in models LNPTRMGRHOURS (coefficient -
0.488, p = .015) and DIFFERENCE (coefficient -0.722, p = .019), but not in LNSTAFFHOURS (p < 
.396).  
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(Table 5) 
Third, in Table 6 we test H2 using Y2010 in a regression where the dependent variable is the ratio of 
staff hours to total hours.12  Here, we expect to observe positive sign for Y2010 which would provide 
support for H2 that audit effort devoted to standardization and documentation that is conducted by staff 
auditors has increased relative to the effort of senior auditors.  The results support this viewpoint 
because the coefficient on Y2010 is positive and significant (p < .058) which indicates that the ratio of 
staff hours to total audit hours has increased over time.  
In addition to the results reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6, we also tested whether variances of senior auditor 
hours (LNPTRMGRHOURS) and junior staff hours (LNSTAFFHOURS) changed between 1996 and 
2010 (Table 2). We can see in Table 2 that the variance of LNPTRMGRHOURS increased (standard 
deviation is 1.135 in 1996 and 1.586 in 2010; p = 0.006) while LNSTAFFHOURS has decreased 
(standard deviation is 2.002 in 1996 and 1.371 in 2010; p = 0.003).13 The increase of variance of 
LNPTRMGRHOURS is consistent with greater responsiveness to idiosyncratic client risks by senior 
auditors, while the decrease in variance of LNSTAFFHOURS is consistent with less responsiveness to 
the idiosyncratic client risks (c.f. Knechel, Salterio & Kochetova-Kozloski, 2010). However, these 
results should be interpreted with care because the variance of client size (LNSALES) has also increased 
(p = 0.015), which is also likely to increase the variance in effort levels. 
(Table 6) 
Additional tests 
                                                     
12 Using the full set of independent variables leads to the model that lacks overall statistical significance. 
Therefore, in Table 6 we report results from a reduced model of the labour mix including only the independent 
variables with the statistically significant coefficients. 
13 We re-run the tests of with a sample where we drop from 2010 the observations with the highest absolute values 
of centred LNSALES and trigger the difference variance between 1996 and 2010 for LNSALES in the full sample. 
We then find that the variance of LNSALES between 1996 and 2010 is statistically equal. After this resampling 
we still obtain the same empirical results: that the variance of junior staff time (senior auditor time) decreased 
(increased) from 1996 to 2010. 
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We test the robustness of our findings in several ways.  First, we repeat our tests using only the same 
audit firms that appear in both years of the sample.  These results are reported in Table 4, Panel C.  The 
primary difference in the results is that INHRISK is now positively associated with LNFEE in 1996 (p 
< .048).  However, this does not change the result for the interaction term and H1a remains unsupported. 
Similarly, junior staff time is positively associated with INHRISK in 1996 (p < .019), but does not 
change the interaction, so H2 is still supported.  On the other hand, the interaction of INHRISK and 
Y2010 for senior auditor time is no longer significant (p < .205), which reduces support for H1b.  
Next, for the regression results reported in Table 4, we increase the comparability of 1996 and 2010 
samples by removing 1996 audits that are smaller (in terms of total hours) than the smallest audits in 
2010 (four audits). This does not change our results or inferences. Third, we examine the sensitivity of 
our results to sampling procedure using a bootstrapping method (Efron & Tibshirani, 1998) to perform 
a repeated resampling of data (untabulated). This yields almost identical results to our main tests, 
decreasing the possibility that our results are due to a chance.14 Finally, we replace our original 
categorical measure of internal control quality (measured at five levels) with a dichotomous variable 
for high and low quality of internal controls. We find that our original categorical variable yields more 
consistent statistical results, whereas the dummy variable generally leads to insignificant parameter 
estimates. 
In Table 7, we report a robustness test on the changes in overall audit effort level by performing an out-
of-sample test in which we follow Bell et al. (2008) in their analysis of expected audit effort levels 
between two periods of time, and Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic and Stein (2003; 2006) who used it 
in their calculation of expected auditor time between Big and non-Big audit firms. We use 1996 as an 
estimation period, and then use this estimation model to predict expected audit hours and fees for 2010. 
This method differs from centring where the benchmarks of comparison are the average values of 
                                                     
14 The sample selection process for 2010 started from the random selection of 110 clients. The final sample of 59 
is not significantly different from the initial sample in terms of client size (LNSALES) and complexity (SUBS) 
variables.   
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distributions. The next step in this analysis is to compare the expected audit hours and fees to actual 
audit hours and fees for the same year.15 The inferences about changes in levels of audit hours and fees 
are based on tests of differences between expected values and actuals values for the same year.  
In Table 7, we see that the mean of the 1996 in-sample prediction for LNTOTALHOURS (5.270) is 
higher than the out-of-sample prediction for the same year (5.025). The difference (-0.244) is significant 
at the 5% confidence level. We find a similar pattern, albeit lacking statistical significance, when we 
compare the in-sample and out-of-sample predictions of LNTOTALHOURS in 2010 (-0.132). The 
reduction of total hours is consistent with the decrease in the ratio of HOURS/SALES from 1996 to 
2010 (Table 2). For LNPTRMGRHOURS, we observe that the in-sample prediction is higher in 1996 
than the out-of-sample in 2010 (4.542 vs. 4.132, p < 0.001), while a parallel result is obtained when the 
2010 in-sample prediction is compared to the 1996 out-of-sample prediction (4.417 vs. 4.537, p = 
0.005). These results are consistent with negative regression coefficient of Y2010 for 
LNPTRMGRHOURS in Table 4, Panel A, confirming the result that effort by senior auditors is 
systematically lower for 2010 engagements. We observe an opposite effect when we examine 
LNSTAFFHOURS (the hours in 2010 are higher than in 1996), although the difference is only 
significant when we compare the 2010 in-sample prediction to the 1996 out-of-sample prediction (4.248 
vs. 3.839, p = 0.026). As the regression coefficient of Y2010 for LNSTAFFHOURS in Table 4 Panel A 
lacks statistical significance, the finding that junior staff hours have increased should be interpreted 
with care. The reduction (p = 0.064) in the relative amount of senior auditor hours 
(PTRMGR/TOTALHRS) from 1996 to 2010 (Table 2) is consistent with the decrease (increase) of the 
relative amount of higher (lower) rank audit hours. Finally, for LNFEES, we see that the differences in 
predictions using both models indicate that fees are systematically higher in 2010 (1996 difference = 
0.180, p = 0.054; 2010 difference = 0.259, p = 0.026). 
                                                     
15 Because it is not known whether 1996 or 2010 provides a better basis for the creation of the estimation model, 
we use both years for this purpose and the other year to the comparison of predicted and observed effort. 
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Essentially, these results suggest that if the audits similar to those conducted in 1996 were performed 
for 2010 clients (keeping the client firm characteristics equal), they would consume fewer total and 
senior auditor hours and more junior staff hours, and the audit fee would be higher. All the tests 
regarding changes in levels of audit hours indicate that senior auditor hours have gone down, while 
junior staff hours have increased.16 
(Table 7) 
5. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the literature by extending our understanding of the effect of changes in the 
regulatory landscape from 1996 to 2010 on the conduct of financial statement audits in a European 
setting. We analyse audit hours and fees and their determinants at two points of time (1996 and 2010) 
and find evidence of a number of interesting changes in the audit process. First, our results show that 
audit fees and audit effort by senior auditors are generally higher for high risk clients in 2010 than in 
1996. Second, we find that the relationship between the client being owner-managed and lower audit 
hours for both senior auditors and junior staff in 1996 is absent in 2010. This supports our hypothesis 
that due to the increase in the auditors’ responsibility for detecting management fraud, owner-managed 
firms require more audit effort than previously. Third, we find that the average level of junior staff 
hours increased between 1996 and 2010, but the variance across engagements declined. In contrast, 
senior auditor hours decreased (as did total audit hours), but the variance across engagements increased 
between 1996 and 2010.  Overall, our results support the view that while the time spent by junior staff 
on compliance and documentation work has increased, the adoption of risk-based auditing has increased 
the efficiency of audits as the time spent by senior auditors has declined. 
                                                     
16 To test whether changes in firm size influence the variance of senior and junior hours over the period, we 
exclude the largest and smallest firms from the analysis until the change in variance becomes insignificant. The 
results show that this does not qualitatively affect the variance of senior and junior audit hours. 
21 
 
Our study has some limitations. First, archival studies are limited to observation of associations rather 
than causality. It is possible that the observed associations between audit hours and client characteristics 
between the two points of time are caused by something other than the changes under study. Second, 
our analysis is limited to the largest audit firms and their relatively large clients. While this should 
increase the generalizability to larger clients outside Finland, it may be that the changes in the 
environment influence smaller audit firms differently. Finally, even if each of the Big N audit firms is 
striving to harmonize their audit approaches globally, differences across institutional settings may limit 
the generalizability of our results. 
Our results lend support to concerns that general increase in regulation and the tightening of audit 
standards reinforced by ex post inspections may have resulted in a more structured approach to auditing 
(Humphrey et al., 2011; Knechel, 2013). These unintended consequences should be of interest to the 
auditing profession and those involved in the development of auditing regulations. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Dependent variables (Audit Effort and Fee): 
LNTOTALHOURS Natural log (total audit hours + 1) 
LNPTRMGRHOURS Natural log (audit hours performed by audit partners/managers). 
PTRMGR/TOTALHRS † Senior audit hours divided by total audit hours 
LNSTAFFHOURS Natural log (audit hours performed by other than senior +1)  
LNFEES Natural log of audit fees 
DIFFERENCE LNPTRMGRHOURS minus LNSTAFFHOURS 
FEES/SALES †  Audit fees divided by net sales *100 
HOURS/SALES † Total audit hours divided by net sales (in €m at 2010 values) 
Independent variables:  
INHERENT RISK Engagement partner’s assessment of level of overall inherent risk coded 
1 for higher than average, and 0 otherwise 
INVREC Sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets 
OWNERMANAGED Coded 1 if > 50% owner-managed and 0 otherwise 
LNSALES Natural log of net sales (in €m at 2010 values) for the parent 
SUBS Number of subsidiaries sorted into deciles (ordinal variable) 
ICQUALITY Engagement partners’ assessment of overall quality of internal controls 
on a 5-point Likert scale 
IAF Coded 1 for companies with an internal audit function IAF and 0 
otherwise 
LISTED Coded 1 if the company belongs to a group listed on a stock exchange 
and 0 otherwise 
MANUFACTURING Coded 1 if company is in the manufacturing sector and 0 otherwise 
Y2010†† Coded 1 for year 2010 and 0 otherwise 
 
  
Notes: 
† The ratios FEES/SALES and HOURS/SALES based on dependent variables are only used in 
univariate tests reported in Table 2. 
††Regression models are first estimated separately for years 1996 and 2010, and then pooled together. 
In a pooled regression, a binary variable Y2010 (indicating observations from 2010) is added into a 
model and all independent variables are interacted with Y2010.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. Panel A Continuous variables 
 1996 (n = 81) 2010 (n = 59)    p-values of the following tests: 
Variables Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev.    T-test            Wilcoxon         Eq. of variances     
LNTOTALHOURS 5.270 5.429 1.214 5.064 4.980 1.200 0.321 0.127 0.937 
LNPTRMGRHOURS 4.542 4.883 1.135 4.147 4.167 1.586 0.105 0.144 0.006 *** 
PTRMGR/TOTALHRS 0.564 0.519 0.291 0.475 0.485 0.258 0.064 * 0.107 0.341 
LNSTAFFHOURS 4.017 4.635 2.002 4.248 4.437 1.371 0.420 0.988 0.003 *** 
LNFEES* 2.867 3.019 1.142 3.098 2.996 1.239 0.256 0.602 0.492 
FEES/SALES* 0.374 0.272 0.384 0.351 0.238 0.329 0.701 0.431 0.215 
HOURS/SALES* 4.245 3.417 4.127 2.478 1.757 2.341 0.002 *** <.001 *** <.001 *** 
INVREC* 0.345 0.320 0.216 0.379 0.390 0.216 0.358 0.345 0.993 
LNSALES* 4.294 4.133 0.944 4.614 4.401 1.265 0.104 0.288 0.015 ** 
SUBS 5.506 5.000 2.864 5.559 6.000 3.064 0.841 0.919 0.571 
ICQUALITY 3.593 4.000 0.685 3.542 4.000 0.795 0.690 0.765 0.217 
 
*All monetary amounts are in 2010 Euros. Data collected for sales and audit fees in 1996 were originally in Finnish marks. They were converted to year 2010 
euros using the 2010 Consumer Index and the official exchange rate between Finnish marks and euros.    
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics Panel B Binary variables 
Variables Percent in 1996 (n = 81)                   Percent in 2010 (n = 59)       p-values of Fisher’s exact test 
    
INHERENT RISK 16.05 6.78 0.120 
OWNERMANAGED 24.69 30.51 0.450 
IAF 44.44 44.07 1.000 
LISTED 38.27 42.37 0.727  
MANUFACTURING 34.57 37.29 0.858 
Table 2 present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests. It also shows the results of the tests of differences (t-test, Wilcoxon non-
parametric test, equality of variances) for the 1996 and 2010 samples. *** p <.001, ** p <.005, * p <.010. P-values are two-tailed. For variable definitions, 
see Table 1. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
Panel A Correlation 1996 (n = 81) with Pearson (Spearman) below (above) the diagonal 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. LNTOTALHOURS 1 0.759 0.777 0.957 -0.104 -0.188 -0.490 0.453 -0.042 0.231 0.100 0.026 -0.032 
2. LNPTRMGRHOURS 0.829 1 0.256 0.806 -0.106 -0.316 -0.329 0.410 0.009 0.128 0.122 0.005 0.073 
3. LNSTAFFHOURS 0.739 0.374 1 0.671 -0.001 -0.019 -0.467 0.300 0.040 0.247 0.035 0.084 -0.066 
4. LNFEE 0.982 0.861 0.694 1 -0.062 -0.225 -0.440 0.498 -0.062 0.213 0.090 0.033 0.011 
5. INHRISK 0.011 -0.035 -0.029 0.000 1 -0.124 0.218 0.055 0.109 -0.271 -0.188 -0.067 0.036 
6. INVREC -0.225 -0.344 -0.061 -0.247 -0.148 1 0.170 -0.141 -0.047 0.016 -0.053 -0.079 -0.131 
7. OWNERMANAGED -0.474 -0.371 -0.529 -0.450 0.218 0.169 1 -0.255 0.109 -0.167 -0.224 -0.451 0.065 
8. LNSALES 0.393 0.394 0.286 0.441 0.047 -0.162 -0.257 1 0.066 0.088 0.241 0.073 0.014 
9. SUBS 0.120 0.086 0.124 0.090 0.111 -0.095 0.109 0.087 1 -0.086 -0.038 -0.070 0.271 
10. ICQUALITY 0.250 0.154 0.248 0.240 -0.282 0.031 -0.162 0.066 -0.110 1 0.115 0.216 -0.074 
11. IAF 0.065 0.096 0.029 0.069 -0.188 -0.055 -0.224 0.276 -0.037 0.097 1 0.165 0.081 
12. LISTED 0.060 0.037 0.100 0.050 -0.067 -0.060 -0.451 0.037 -0.069 0.210 0.165 1 0.069 
13. MANUFACTURING 0.086 0.159 -0.087 0.109 0.036 -0.153 0.065 0.034 0.272 -0.099 0.081 0.069 1 
In Table 3, correlations with <0.05 p-value (two-tailed) have been written in italics. The cut-off values for 1%, 5% and 10% significances (two-tailed) are 
0.2155, 0.1648 and 0.1386 (respectively). For variable definitions, see Table 1. 
 
  
29 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
Panel B Correlation 2010 (n = 59) Pearson (Spearman) below (above) the diagonal 
                                               1.           2.            3.           4.            5.           6.           7.           8.             9.          10.         11.           12.       13.  
1. LNTOTALHOURS 1 0.896 0.898 0.942 0.158 -0.149 -0.071 0.604 0.746 -0.097 0.025 0.154 0.064 
2. LNPTRMGRHOURS 0.895 1 0.651 0.871 0.158 -0.170 -0.130 0.534 0.726 -0.060 -0.069 0.131 -0.025 
3. LNSTAFFHOURS 0.821 0.552 1 0.854 0.091 -0.067 0.009 0.570 0.644 -0.141 0.098 0.116 0.109 
4. LNFEE 0.948 0.891 0.777 1 0.149 -0.131 -0.063 0.595 0.769 -0.021 -0.076 0.175 0.016 
5. INHRISK 0.134 0.133 0.108 0.125 1 0.057 0.114 -0.115 0.038 -0.240 -0.104 -0.095 0.210 
6. INVREC -0.118 -0.122 -0.111 -0.113 0.042 1 0.431 -0.081 -0.095 -0.199 -0.139 -0.150 0.008 
7. OWNERMANAGED -0.037 -0.075 -0.024 -0.030 0.114 0.417 1 -0.185 0.013 -0.116 -0.366 -0.494 0.098 
8. LNSALES 0.616 0.569 0.552 0.637 -0.113 -0.097 -0.170 1 0.512 0.143 0.278 0.259 0.005 
9. SUBS 0.711 0.680 0.540 0.707 0.039 -0.142 0.023 0.540 1 -0.165 -0.212 0.085 0.050 
10. ICQUALITY -0.071 -0.010 -0.077 -0.010 -0.271 -0.207 -0.129 0.093 -0.162 1 0.063 0.214 -0.202 
11. IAF -0.009 -0.097 0.130 -0.035 -0.104 -0.142 -0.366 0.314 -0.220 0.082 1 0.344 -0.049 
12. LISTED 0.099 0.134 0.135 0.146 -0.095 -0.150 -0.494 0.275 0.079 0.193 0.344 1 -0.094 
13. MANUFACTURING 0.090 -0.062 0.168 0.019 0.210 0.030 0.098 0.020 0.054 -0.175 -0.049 -0.094 1 
In Table 3, correlations with <0.05 p-value (two-tailed) have been written in italics. The cut-off values for 1%, 5% and 10% significances (two-tailed) are 
0.2155, 0.1648 and 0.1386 (respectively). See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4. Panel A Determinants of audit effort: Test of differences between 1996 and 2010 (OLS Regression) 
 LNTOTALHOURS LNPTRMGRHOURS LNSTAFFHOURS DIFFERENCE LNFEE 
Variables Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value 
INHRISK 0.419 0.172  0.002 0.994  0.677 0.161  -0.674 0.214  0.300 0.310  
INHRISK * Y2010 0.322 0.585  1.213 0.072 * -0.073 0.937  1.286 0.218  0.556 0.328  
INVREC -0.433 0.385  -1.220 0.033 ** 0.652 0.406  -1.872 0.035 ** -0.537 0.265  
INVREC * Y2010 0.400 0.625  1.223 0.190  -0.942 0.464  2.165 0.136  0.499 0.527  
OWNERMANAGED -1.466 <.001 *** -0.897 0.007 *** -2.862 <.001 *** 1.964 <.001 *** -1.236 <.001 *** 
OWNERMANAGED * Y2010 1.421 0.002 *** 0.651 0.197  3.098 <.001 *** -2.446 0.002 *** 1.277 0.003 *** 
LNSALES 0.312 0.010 *** 0.331 0.016 ** 0.289 0.124  0.042 0.841  0.374 0.001 *** 
LNSALES * Y2010 0.016 0.930  0.122 0.558  0.050 0.860  0.071 0.825  0.017 0.922  
SUBS 0.048 0.201  0.015 0.732  0.138 0.022 ** -0.123 0.067 * 0.026 0.481  
SUBS * 2010 0.159 0.022 ** 0.228 0.004 *** 0.033 0.760  0.195 0.111  0.171 0.011 ** 
ICQUALITY 0.473 0.004 ** 0.248 0.175  0.691 0.007 *** -0.444 0.119  0.416 0.008 *** 
ICQUALITY * Y2010 -0.422 0.074 * -0.119 0.657  -0.707 0.057 * 0.588 0.158  -0.302 0.183  
IAF -0.229 0.300  -0.153 0.543  -0.403 0.247  0.250 0.522  -0.244 0.253  
IAF * Y2010 0.281 0.464  -0.242 0.579  0.808 0.181  -1.050 0.123  0.130 0.724  
LISTED -0.552 0.024 ** -0.395 0.154  -0.768 0.045 ** 0.374 0.384  -0.496 0.035 ** 
LISTED * Y2010 0.446 0.243  0.394 0.364  0.834 0.165  -0.440 0.513  0.544 0.140  
MANUFACTURING 0.290 0.205  0.375 0.150  -0.227 0.526  0.602 0.137  0.335 0.128  
MANUFACTURING * Y2010 -0.226 0.509  -0.776 0.048 ** 0.563 0.296  -1.339 0.028 ** -0.440 0.183  
Y2010 -0.430 0.711  -2.314 0.082 * 0.994 0.586  -3.308 0.109  -0.440 0.694  
                
R2  0.509   0.494   0.431   0.253   0.527  
R2 adj.  0.432   0.414   0.341   0.135   0.452  
N  140   140   140   140   140  
Table 4 Panel A displays the test of differences between 1996 and 2010 in the magnitudes of the determinants of audit effort for the following dependent variables: 
LNTOTALHOURS, LNSENIORHOURS, LNSTAFFHOURS, DIFFERENCE and LNFEES. For example, for LNPTRMGRHOURS, the regression coefficient for 
INHRISK in 1996 is 0.002 (p-value 0.99). The difference between the INHRISK regression coefficients in 1996 and 2010 (labelled as INHRISK * Y2010) is 1.213 
(p-value 0.008). P-values are two-tailed. Intercepts are not reported due to confidentiality. Dependent variable DIFFERENCE has been computed as 
LNPTRMGRHOURS - LNSTAFFHOURS. See Table 1 for other variable definitions.  
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Table 4. Panel B Determinants of audit effort in 2010 (OLS regression) 
   LNTOTALHOURS LNPTRMGRHOURS      LNSTAFFHOURS         LNFEE 
 Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  
             
INHRISK 0.741 0.107  1.216 0.056 * 0.604 0.332  0.856 0.066 * 
INVREC -0.033 0.955  0.002 0.998  -0.290 0.716  -0.037 0.949  
OWNERMANAGED -0.045 0.880  -0.246 0.554  0.236 0.568  0.040 0.895  
LNSALES 0.328 0.011 ** 0.452 0.011 ** 0.339 0.051  0.391 0.003 *** 
SUBS 0.208 <.001 *** 0.243 0.001 *** 0.171 0.019 ** 0.197 <.001 *** 
ICQUALITY 0.051 0.743  0.129 0.544  -0.015 0.942  0.114 0.466  
IAF 0.052 0.855  -0.395 0.311  0.404 0.297  -0.114 0.689  
LISTED -0.106 0.689  -0.001 0.998  0.066 0.856  0.047 0.860  
MANUFACTURING 0.064 0.781  -0.401 0.208  0.336 0.288  -0.105 0.652  
             
R2  0.608   0.574   0.437   0.623  
R2 adj.  0.536   0.496   0.334   0.554  
N       59        59        59        59  
P-values are two-tailed. Intercepts are not reported due to confidentiality. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4. Panel C Determinants of audit effort: Test of differences between 1996 and 2010, comparable audit firm(s) (OLS regression) 
    LNTOTALHOURS LNPTRMGRHOURS      LNSTAFFHOURS          LNFEE 
 Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  
             
INHRISK 0.832 0.032  0.269 0.559  1.307 0.019 ** 0.731 0.048 ** 
INHRISK * Y2010 -0.091 0.883  0.947 0.205  -0.703 0.427  0.125 0.832  
INVREC -0.530 0.412  -1.213 0.120  0.135 0.883  -0.629 0.309  
INVREC * Y2010 0.497 0.580  1.216 0.262  -0.426 0.740  0.591 0.491  
OWNERMANAGED -1.385 <.001 *** -1.004 0.030 ** -1.668 0.003 *** -1.070 0.004 *** 
OWNERMANAGED * Y2010 1.340 0.008 *** 0.758 0.208  1.904 0.009 *** 1.110 0.022 ** 
LNSALES 0.115 0.438  0.224 0.211  0.084 0.692  0.211 0.138  
LNSALES * Y2010 0.213 0.288  0.228 0.342  0.255 0.373  0.180 0.346  
SUBS 0.113 0.029 ** 0.066 0.286  0.168 0.023 ** 0.083 0.090 * 
SUBS * 2010 0.094 0.212  0.177 0.054 * 0.002 0.983  0.113 0.119  
ICQUALITY 0.897 <.001 *** 0.584 0.015 ** 1.156 <.001 *** 0.815 <.001 *** 
ICQUALITY * Y2010 -0.846 0.001 *** -0.455 0.144  -1.171 0.002 *** -0.701 0.005 *** 
IAF 0.091 0.756  0.081 0.817  -0.080 0.849  0.071 0.798  
IAF * Y2010 -0.039 0.926  -0.477 0.347  0.484 0.422  -0.186 0.644  
LISTED -0.319 0.277  -0.206 0.558  -0.530 0.207  -0.284 0.310  
LISTED * Y2010 0.213 0.601  0.205 0.675  0.595 0.308  0.332 0.395  
MANUFACTURING 0.243 0.395  0.217 0.528  0.269 0.511  0.294 0.283  
MANUFACTURING * Y2010 -0.180 0.634  -0.618 0.175  0.067 0.901  -0.399 0.270  
Y2010 1.003 0.460  -0.957 0.557  2.352 0.227  0.978 0.451  
             
R2  0.590   0.547   0.446   0.604  
R2 adj.  0.502   0.450   0.328   0.520  
N  109   109   109   109  
P-values are two-tailed. Intercepts are not reported due to confidentiality. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Monetary amounts are in 2010 Euros. 
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Table 5. Change in the level of audit effort (OLS regression with centered continuous variables) 
 LNTOTALHOURS LNPTRMGRHOURS LNSTAFFHOURS DIFFERENCE LNFEE 
Variables Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value Coeff.    p-value 
INHRISK 0.337 0.221  0.125 0.688  0.476 0.273  -0.351 0.463  0.273 0.303  
INVREC -0.087 0.834  -0.681 0.148  0.770 0.240  -1.450 0.046 ** -0.199 0.617  
OWNERMANAGED -0.826 <.001 *** -0.524 0.046 ** -1.584 <.001 *** 1.060 0.009 *** -0.646 0.004 *** 
LNSALES 0.429 <.001 *** 0.503 <.001 *** 0.413 0.003 *** 0.089 0.558  0.490 <.001 *** 
SUBS 0.106 0.001 *** 0.114 0.002 *** 0.134 0.009 *** -0.019 0.725  0.092 0.003 *** 
ICQUALITY 0.213 0.084 * 0.116 0.408  0.327 0.094  -0.211 0.325  0.214 0.072 * 
IAF -0.261 0.163  -0.378 0.076 * -0.227 0.440  -0.151 0.643  -0.323 0.074 * 
LISTED -0.296 0.133  -0.124 0.577  -0.405 0.193  0.280 0.413  -0.197 0.300  
MANUFACTURING 0.167 0.350  0.016 0.936  0.011 0.968  0.005 0.988  0.116 0.500  
Y2010 -0.250 0.153  -0.488 0.015 ** 0.233 0.396  -0.722 0.019 ** 0.153 0.362  
                
R2  0.395   0.377   0.289   0.104   0.415  
R2 adj.  0.348   0.329   0.234   0.035   0.370  
N  140   140   140   140   140  
 
Table 6 shows the results for the models where all continuous variables have been centred over pooled data from 1996 and 2010. Dependent variable 
DIFFERENCE has been computed as LNPTRMGRHOURS - LNSTAFFHOURS. See Table 1 for other variable definitions. P-values are two-tailed. *** p < 
.001, ** p < .005, * p < .010. Intercepts are not reported due to confidentiality. 
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Table 6. Labour mix regression 
    STAFF to TOTALHOURS 
 Coeff. p-value  
    
INVREC -0.108 0.063 * 
OWNERMANAGED 0.088 0.061 * 
Y2010 0.210 0.058 * 
R2  0.065  
R2 adj.  0.044  
n  140  
 
Table 6 shows the results for the labour mix regression model where the dependent variable has been defined as the ratio of staff hours to total audit hours. Only 
statistically significant independent variables have been included in the model, because of otherwise statistically insignificant model. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. P-values are two-tailed, based on heteroscedasticy consistent standard errors. *** p <.001, ** p <.005, * p <.010. Intercept is not reported due to 
confidentiality. 
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Table 7. In-sample and out-of-sample examination of audit effort (t-test) 
LNTOTALHOURS Mean (Std.dev.)  Mean (Std.dev.)  Difference p-value 
 in-sample out-of-sample  in-sample out-of-sample    
1996 (n=81) 5.270  (0.799)  5.025 (0.783) -0.244 ** 0.012 
2010 (n=59)  5.195 (0.890) 5.064  (0.936) -0.132  0.265 
         
LNPTRMGRHOURS Mean Std.dev.  Mean (Std.dev.)    
 in-sample out-of-sample  in-sample out-of-sample    
1996 (n=81) 4.542  (0.675)  4.132 (0.985) -0.410 *** <.001 
2010 (n=59)  4.537 (0.755) 4.147  (1.202) -0.390 *** 0.005 
         
LNSTAFFHOURS Mean (Std.dev.)  Mean (Std.dev.)    
 in-sample out-of-sample  in-sample out-of-sample    
1996 (n=81) 4.017  (1.305)  4.171 (0.783) 0.154 0.325 
2010 (n=59)  3.839 (1.404) 4.248  (0.906) 0.409 ** 0.026 
         
LNFEE* Mean (Std.dev.)  Mean (Std.dev.)    
 in-sample out-of-sample  in-sample out-of-sample    
1996 (n=81) 2.867  (0.754)  3.047 (0.784) 0.180 * 0.054 
2010 (n=59)  2.839 (0.842) 3.098  (0.978) 0.259 ** 0.026 
Table 7 shows the predicted (in-sample and out-of-sample) levels of audit effort and fees. *** p <.001, ** p <.005, * p <.010. P-values are two-tailed. See Table 
1 for variable definitions. Monetary amounts are in 2010 euros. 
 
